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Abstract 
Social choice models usually assume that choice is among exogenously given and non decomposable alternatives. 
Often, on the contrary, choice is among objects that are constructed by individuals or institutions as complex bundles 
made of many interdependent components. In this paper we present a model of object construction in majority voting 
and show that, in general, by appropriate changes of such bundles, different social outcomes may be obtained, 
depending upon initial conditions and agenda, intransitive cycles and median voter dominance may be made appear or 
disappear, and that, finally, decidability may be ensured by increasing manipulability or viceversa.
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     1. The problem
In social choice theory agents choose from a set of alternatives which are both \simple"
and exogenously given. Alternatives are \simple" in that they are one-dimensional points
lacking an internal structure and they are exogenously given in that the pre-choice process
through which they are constructed is not analyzed.
We try and model a world in which objects are rst constructed as bundles of features
and then submitted to voting according to a majority rule.
For instance, when called to make a decision on \what shall we do tonight", the
process of building the two elements of the choice set \going to the movies" and \going
to a restaurant" might well be considered. Under this perspective, the two objects are
underdetermined labels for bundles of elements (e.g. with whom, where, when, movie
genre, director, type of food, etc.) that are to be bundled together in possibly dierent
ways. It then follows that objects' internal structure is likely to interact in non trivial ways
with interdependencies and non-separabilities in individual preferences. In the \what
shall we do tonight" choice setting, for instance, my preference on the \with whom"
element is likely to be highly interdependent with other elements, as I may well nd a
given person a perfect companion for an evening at the movies but dislike his company
if we nally decide to go to a restaurant. We study how building an object by bundling
its features in dierent ways aects the selection process of a social outcome.
We show that, in general, by appropriate manipulations of the set of objects, almost
every social outcome may be obtained from a given social choice rule. Such \object
construction power", that is, the power of bundling objects according to dierent compo-
sitions of their features appears to be stronger than agenda power in determining social
outcomes.
We then show that this power of manipulation also includes the possibility of breaking
or creating intransitive cycles and of overturning the median voter eect.
Finally we discuss an emerging trade-o between non manipulability and decidability.
While some object constructions make social decisions less manipulable but increase the
likelihood of intransitive cycles and the time required to reach a socially optimal outcome
(if any), others make cycles less likely and reach a social outcome faster, but the number of
locally optimal social outcomes greatly increases thus making the scope for manipulability
broader.
Our work is close in spirit with context-dependent voting. In Callander and Wilson
(2006) or Kahneman and Tversky (2006) context-dependency refers to the violation of the
axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. In our model we assume a dierent form
of context dependency: preferences between two instantiations of an element (\feature"
in our terminology) in general depend on the value taken by other traits. We argue why
this form of non-separability is very likely to happen in our context of objects made up
of interdependent features. Our work is also clearly similar to the literature on agenda
power { McKelvey (1976) and Plott and Levine (1978) { but we generalize some of those
results in showing that even agenda power is subject to manipulation through object
construction.
2. The model
Choices are made over bundles of features. We call F = ff1;f2;:::;fng the nite set
of such features. Each feature takes a value out of a nite set of possible values. We
1assume that each feature can take the same number of values `  2. Thus the set of of
social outcomes is thus given by the set X = fx1;x2;:::;x`ng.
Objects are dened as bundles of features. Let I = f1;2;:::;ng be an index set and
let an object Ci  I be a non empty subset thereof. We call the size of object Ci , its
cardinality jCij. We dene an object scheme as a set of objects C = fC1;C2;:::;Ckg
such that
Sk
i=1 Ci = I. The size of an object scheme is dened by its largest component:
jCj = max fjC1j;jC2j;:::jCkjg. An objects-scheme does not necessarily have to be a
partition as features may belong to more than one object.
There exist h individual agents A = fa1;a2;:::;ahg, each characterized by a transitive
and complete preference relation i over the set of outcomes X.
Individual preferences are aggregated through some social decision rule <. We assume
that individual preferences are expressed sincerely through majority voting (even if any
social decision rule might be adopted). We write xj < xi if xj defeats xi according to
<.
Given an outcome xi 2 X and an objects-scheme C, we call instantiation of an object
Cj 2 C, that we denote by xi(Cj), the substring of length jCjj containing the components
in xi belonging to object Cj: xi(Cj) = fi
j1fi
j2 :::fi
jjCjj for all jh 2 Cj
Two object instantiations can be united by means of the non commutative _ operator
which produces the union of the two instantiations with the rst instantiation's compo-
nents where the two intersect: x(Cj) _ y(Ch) = z(Cj [ Ch) where z = x if  2 Cj and
z = y otherwise. We can therefore write xi = xi(Cj) _ xi(C j) for any Cj.
An agenda  = C1C2 :::Ck over the objects scheme C is a permutation of the set
of objects which states the order in which the objects are examined.
We suppose that if an initial social outcome is (randomly) given then the rst object
of the agenda is considered and all object instantiations are generated. At every step
agents vote the status quo against a new outcome in which the components of the object
under consideration are replaced by new object instantiations, whereas all other objects
are kept unchanged in their initial values. The outcome obtaining the majority becomes
the (new) status quo.
When all instantiations have been examined for the rst object in the agenda, the
same procedure is repeated for the second, third, ..., k  th object in the agenda. As to
the stopping rule we adopt the following: objects which have already been settled can be
re-examined if new social improvements have become possible.
Given an objects-scheme C = fC1;C2;:::;Ckg, we say that an outcome xi is a pre-
ferred neighbour of outcome xj with respect to an object Ch 2 C if the following three
conditions hold: 1) xi  xj; 2) x
i = x
j 8 = 2 Ch; 3) xi 6= xj.
Conditions 2 and 3 require that the two outcomes dier only in components belonging
to object Ch. According to the denition, a neighbour can be reached from a given
outcome by voting on a single object.
We call Hi(x;Ci) the set of preferred neighbours of an outcome x for object Ci.
A path P(xi;C) from an outcome xi and for an objects-scheme C is a sequence, starting
from xi, of preferred neighbours: P(xi;C) = xi;xi+1;xi+2;::: with xi+m+1 2 H(xi+m;C).
An outcome xj is reachable from another outcome xi and for objects-scheme C if there
exists a path P(xi;C) such that xj 2 P(xi;C).
A path can end up either in a social (local) optimum, i.e. an outcome which does
not have any preferred neighbour, or in a cycle among a set of outcomes which are
preferred neighbours to each other. The latter is the well-known case of intransitive
social preferences.
2The set of best neighbours Bi(x;Ci)  Hi(x;Ci) of an outcome x for object Ci is
the set of the socially most preferred outcomes in the set of neighbours: Bi(x;Ci) =
fy 2 Hi(x;Ci) such that y < z 8z 2 Hi(x;Ci)g By extension from a single object to




An outcome x is a local optimum for the objects-scheme C if there does not exist an
outcome y such that y 2 H(x;C) and y < x.
Suppose outcome xj is a local optimum for objects-scheme C, we call basin of at-
traction of xj for objects-scheme C the set of all outcomes from which xj is reachable:
	(xj;C) = fy; such that 9P(y;C) with xj 2 P(y;C)g.
A cycle is a set X0 = fx0
1;x0
2;:::;x0
jg of outcomes such that x0
1 < x0
2 < ::: < x0
j <
x0
1 and that for all x 2 X0, if x has a preferred neighbour y 2 H(x;C) then necessarily
y 2 X0.
3. Objects, local optima and cycles
We now discuss the fundamental properties of paths in the set of outcomes which are
generated by voting processes. Our algorithmic approach allows us to trace all the possible
paths and characterize all possible outcomes for every initial condition.
We will only discuss only the more general case in which all objects can be always
re-examined until no further social improvement becomes possible.
We show that, in general, social outcomes depend upon the adopted objects scheme
and that by appropriately modifying it one can obtain dierent social outcomes or even
the appearance or disappearance of intransitive cycles.
We rst show that, in general, dierent objects-schemes can produce dierent social
outcomes.
Consider rst a very simple example in which 5 agents have a common most preferred
choice. Table 1 presents their individual preferences, ranked from the most to the least
preferred outcome:
Order Agent1 Agent2 Agent3 Agent4 Agent5
1st 011 011 011 011 011
2nd 111 000 010 101 111
3rd 000 001 001 111 000
4th 010 110 101 110 010
5th 100 010 000 100 001
6th 110 111 110 001 101
7th 101 101 111 010 110
8th 001 100 100 000 100
Table 1: Objects and social outcomes
It is easy to show that if voting is based upon the objects-scheme C = fff1;f2;f3gg
the only local optimum is the global one 011 whose basin of attraction is the entire set X.
If instead voting is based upon the objects-scheme C = fff1g;ff2g;ff3gg we have the
appearance of multiple local optima and agenda-dependence. If for instance the agenda
is the sequence ff1g;ff2g;ff3g then 000 is the local optimum whose basin of attraction
contains half the possible initial outcomes. For instance, if we start from 110, three out
of ve agents will vote for changing the rst component into a 0: 010 is in fact the best
3neighbour of 110 for object ff1g. Then object ff2g is considered and again the majority
(3 out of 5) decide to move to 000. Then no other change can get a majority consensus.
If instead the agenda is the sequence ff3g;ff2g;ff1g it is easy to check that the same
initial condition 110 will lead to the global optimum 011.
Even stronger cases may be generated where dierent objects-schemes produce dier-
ent global optima. Table 2 presents one such example.
Rank Agent1 Agent2 Agent3
1st 011 010 000
2nd 000 100 110
3rd 010 101 101
4th 110 011 011
5th 100 000 010
6th 101 110 100
7th 001 001 001
8th 111 111 111
Table 2: Dierent objects induce dierent global optima
In this three agents case it is easy to verify that with the objects scheme C =
fff1;f2g;ff3gg 000 is the (unique) global optimum, while with the dierent scheme
C = fff1g;ff2;f3gg 011 is instead the (unique) global optimum.
Both multiplicity of social outcomes and agenda-dependence appear to be linked to
the specic set of objects which voting is based upon.
Another property of social decision rules is the well-known voting paradox: even in
the presence of transitive individual preferences, social preferences expressed through
some voting rule may be cyclical and therefore social outcomes are indeterminate. In
our model this property turns out to be dependent upon the specic scheme of objects
through which voting takes place. By appropriately modifying objects, cycles may in fact
appear or disappear, holding the set of social outcomes and agents' preferences constant.
This \possibility" result may be illustrated by means of an example which is a translation
in our formalism of the standard textbook case. Consider the case of three agents and
three objects with individual preferences expressed by the following Table 3:
Order Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3
1st x y z
2nd y z x
3rd z x y
Table 3: Cycles in social preferences
It is easy to verify that with these individual preferences, social preferences expressed
through majority rule are intransitive and cycle among the three objects: x < y and
y < z, but z < x.
Suppose now that x,y,z are three-components objects which we encode according to the
following mapping: x 7! 000;y 7! 100;z 7! 010. All other combinations of components
are dominated by x,y and z for all agents and we suppose, for simplicity, that preferences
among them are identical across agents. All in all, individual preferences are given in
Table 4.
4Order Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3
1st 000 100 010
2nd 100 010 000
3th 010 000 100
4th 110 110 110
5th 001 001 001
6th 101 101 101
7th 011 011 011
8th 111 111 111
Table 4: Objects and intransitivity I
It is easy to verify that if voting is based upon the unique object C = fff1;f2;f3gg
the voting process always ends up in the cycle among x,y and z. The same happens if
each component is a separate object: Ca = fff1g;ff2g;ff3gg.
However, if schemes Cb = fff1g;ff2;f3gg or Cd = fff1;f3g;ff2gg are employed,
voting always produces the unique global social optimum 010 in both cases. The latter
outcome is the most preferred one by agent 3, who can therefore try to have one of these
schemes adopted. All other objects-schemes always determine cycles: the social outcomes
000 and 100 which are the ones most preferred by, respectively, agents 1 and 2 cannot be
obtained as social optima by any set of objects with this encoding. They could however
be obtained with a dierent encoding.
Consider the following encoding for x;y;z: x 7! 100;y 7! 010;z 7! 001 and individual
preferences of table 5:
Order Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3
1st 100 010 001
2nd 010 001 100
3th 001 100 010
4th 000 000 000
5th 110 110 110
6th 101 101 101
7th 011 011 011
8th 111 111 111
Table 5: Objects and intransitivity II
Once again we obtain cycles when voting is based upon the unique object C =
fff1;f2;f3gg, if instead each component is voted as a separate object: C = fff1g;ff2g;ff3gg
we have three local optima: 100;010;001 whose basins of attraction depend, both in size
and location, upon the agenda. With the objects-scheme C = fff1g;ff2;f3gg we have
only the two local optima 100 and 010, while C = fff1;f3g;ff2gg produces the two local
optima 010 and 001 and C = fff1;f3g;ff2gg produces the two local optima 100 and 001.
Let us recall also that if jCj is the size of the objects-scheme, the number of pairwise
votes needed to nd an optimum or a cycle is proportional to `jCj. Thus small size objects
render decidability more likely not only in the sense that cycles are less likely, but also in
the sense that a choice may be made in a reasonable time. However, decidability may be
obtained only by increasing manipulability because smaller size objects highly increase
the number of locally optimal outcomes.
54. Objects and the median voter theorem
A relatively trivial consequence of the framework outlined so far is that also the median
voter theorem is weakened in a more general setting in which objects can be modied by
aggregating or disaggregating basic components.
By applying the framework developed so far we can easily design examples in which
we do not have cycles and the median voter's most preferred policy does indeed win a
pairwise majority contest for some objects-schemes but not for others, where, on the
contrary, he or she might lose on all the objects.
Let us provide a simple example in which this happens. Let us suppose that some
overall policy can be implemented with 8 possible levels of strength ranked from 0 (the
null level) to 7 (the strongest implementation level). There are seven voters, each of
whom preferring a dierent level, with the exception of level 0, 1 which nobody prefers.
For all voters the remaining levels are ranked according to their distance from the most
preferred one and in case of equal distance, the higher level is preferred to the lower.
Individual preferences are summarized in Table 6:
Order Ag1 Ag2 Ag3 Ag4 Ag5 Ag6 Ag7
1st 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2nd 2 3 4 5 6 7 6
3rd 0 1 2 3 4 5 5
4th 3 4 5 6 7 4 4
5th 4 0 1 2 3 3 3
6th 5 5 6 7 2 2 2
7th 6 6 0 1 1 1 1
8th 7 7 7 0 0 0 0
Table 6: Median voter theorem, an example: part I
Agent 4 is the median voter, every agent has single peaked preferences and therefore
level 4 is the unique social outcome of pairwise voting.
However, let us now suppose that policy levels are codied by 3 digits binary numbers:
Order Ag1 Ag2 Ag3 Ag4 Ag5 Ag6 Ag7
1st 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
2nd 010 011 100 101 110 111 110
3rd 000 001 010 011 100 101 101
4th 011 100 101 110 111 100 100
5th 100 000 001 010 011 011 011
6th 101 101 110 111 010 010 010
7th 110 110 000 001 001 001 001
8th 111 111 111 000 000 000 000
Table 7: Median voter theorem, an example: part II
If voting is based upon the largest object C = fff1;f2;f3gg the unique social optimum
100, corresponding to level 4, is again always achieved. However if each component is
1We omit an agent preferring level 0 in order to have an odd number of agents and a well-dened
median voter.
6voted as a separate object, i.e. C = fff1g;ff2g;ff3gg we have two local optima: one
that corresponds to the median voter's most preferred policy, i.e. 100 and the other that
is exactly the opposite of the median voter's most preferred combination of components,
i.e. 011. No cycles appear. Thus, with an appropriate combination of objects-schemes
and initial conditions, the median voter's inexorable \democratic dictatorship" can be
overturned and the median voter transformed into an outright loser of majority vote, also
in the absence of any cycle.
Notice that if the number of components increases we can obtain once again an in-
creasing number of local optima. For instance, if we build an analogous binary encoding
example with 8 components, 256 possible social outcomes and 255 agents, we obtain a
unique social optimum 10000000, corresponding to the median voter's most preferred
outcome, if voting is based upon the objects-scheme C = fff1;f2;:::;f8gg; two opposite
local optima 10000000 and 01111111 if the two objects ff1;f2;f3;f4g and ff5;f6;f7;f8g
are used; and two additional specular local optima, 01111011 and 10000100, if every
component is voted separately.
5. Objects and outcomes with random agents
An interesting is to try and measure how likely or plausible such phenomena are, that
is to ask questions like: a) how many local optima are we likely to encounter? b) how
dierent and/or distant from each other are such local optima? c) how does the number
and location of local optima change with a modication of objects? d) how likely are
cycles?
We simulate in fact the above described voting model for populations of randomly
generated agents, i.e. agents whose order relation over the elements of the set X is
totally random but always derived from transitive preferences.
In the rst benchmark simulation we consider a set of 8 binary components and there-
fore a space of 256 outcomes, on which a population of 99 random agents vote following
the majority rule. All the results we present here and below { unless otherwise specied
{ are averages over 1,000 repetitions of a simulation all with the same parameters but a
dierent randomly generated population.
We have tested the following agendas:
 1 = f1;2;3;4;5;6;7;8g
 2 = f1;2;3;4g;f5;6;7;8g
 4 = f1;2g;f3;4g;f5;6g;f7;8g
 8 = f1g;f2g;f3g;f4g;f5g;f6g;f7g;f8g
7Table 8 presents a summary of results:
Agenda No. of cases Average no. of No. of cases Average


















Table 8: Objects, local optima and cycles (n=8, No. agents=99, 1000 repetitions)
( indicates that some cases present cycles for some initial conditions and local optima for
others;  indicates that all cases present cycles for some initial conditions and local optima for
others; standard deviations in brackets)
The table shows that for agenda 1, that is a single object containing all the com-
ponents, we almost always have intransitive cycles and that these cycles are rather long
(almost 40 dierent social outcomes on average). Only in about 5% of the randomly gen-
erated populations do we obtain a social optimum, which is obviously always achieved
by voting based on 1. All in all, intransitive social cycles are the rule in all but a small
number of cases.
If instead we take the other extreme, i.e. agenda 8 based on the set of nest objects,
in 682 out of 1000 populations we do not observe cycles, but voting ends in a local
optimum. On average there are 15.66 local optima (with standard deviation 3.05).
In the remaining 318 cases we observe that voting can end up either on a local optimum
or in a cycle, depending upon the initial condition. In particular, in those cases in which
we observe cycles, the latter are the outcome in { on average { 42.83 (with a large standard
deviation of 32.58) out of the 256 possible starting conditions. When they appear, cycles
are short, consisting on average in about 3 outcomes. Thus, cycles are not very frequent,
but on the other hand, we have a considerable number of local optima, whose selection
depends upon the initial condition.
With agenda 4 we always (all 1000 repetitions) observe the coexistence of cycles and
local optima in the same social decision problem, depending upon the initial condition.
On average, out of the 256 initial conditions, 128.85 (standard deviation 28.26) lead to a
cycle and the remaining to a local optimum. In the latter event, the average number of
local optima is 9.19.
Finally, with agenda 2 we observe 60 repetitions in which we observe only cycles for
all 256 initial conditions, whereas in the 940 remaining cases cycles appear on average
for 206.53 (standard deviation 28.61) initial conditions. The other initial conditions lead
to one out of about 4 local optima. Also in this case cycles tend to be short, as they are
made up of on average 4.67 outcomes.
To summarize, we observe a very clear trade-o between the presence of cycles and
the number of local optima. When large objects are employed, cycles are very likely to
occur. The likelihood rapidly drops when increasingly ne objects are employed, but at
the same time the number of local optima increases. This implies that a social outcome
8is determined (and as already mentioned can be reached in a shorter time) but which
specic social outcome strongly depends upon the specic objects-scheme employed, the
agenda and the initial condition, i.e. the social outcome becomes easily manipulable by
an authority with object construction power.
We have also checked whether local optima tend to concentrate in particular parts of
the space, that is if, for a single repetition of the simulation, local optima are somehow
similar, in the sense that they display at least for some components the same value. All
tests reject this hypothesis: the distribution of local optima in the outcome space appears
indistinguishable from a randomly generated one.
If we decrease the number of agents we do not observe any dierence for the case of
one object agenda 1, while for ner objects we observe a slow increase in the number of
local optima and a decrease in the frequency of cycles. For instance, with 9 agents and
the eight nest objects (8), the number of local optima increases on average to 16.89 and
cycles appear in 284 repetitions, and in those cases on average only 34 initial conditions
lead to a cycle. With only three agents the average number of local optima is 20.01 (st.
dev. 3.15) and cycles appear in 176 out of 1000 repetitions, and in the latter only for
30.52 out of 256 initial conditions. A smaller number of agents seems therefore to reduce
the likelihood of cycles.
Finally we can test what happens if we decrease the number of components. Table 9
presents the results of an analogous simulations with 99 agents on a \simpler" decision
problem with only four components and the three agendas: 1) 1 = ff1;2;3;4gg; 2)
2 = ff1;2g;f5;6gg and 3) 4 = ff1g;f2g;f3g;f4gg.
Agenda No. of cases Average no. of No. of cases Average














Table 9: Objects, local optima and cycles
(n=4, No. agents=99, 1000 repetitions)
( indicates that some cases present cycles for some initial conditions and local optima for
others;)
Results are in line with those of the previous table. Of course we observe a considerable
decrease in the number of local optima and length of cycles due to the vast decrease of
the size of the combinatorial search space. We also observe an overall decrease in the
occurrence of cycles for all sets of objects.
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